我的应用程序有一个特定的功能，只能在根可用的设备上工作。与其让这个特性在使用时失败(然后向用户显示适当的错误消息)，我更希望能够先静默地检查根目录是否可用，如果不可用，则首先隐藏相应的选项。
有办法做到这一点吗?
一些用于设置系统属性ro的修改版本。Modversion用于此目的。事情似乎已经发生了变化;我几个月前在TheDude上的构建是这样的:
cmb@apollo:~$ adb -d shell getprop |grep build
[ro.build.id]: [CUPCAKE]
[ro.build.display.id]: [htc_dream-eng 1.5 CUPCAKE eng.TheDudeAbides.20090427.235325 test-keys]
[ro.build.version.incremental]: [eng.TheDude.2009027.235325]
[ro.build.version.sdk]: [3]
[ro.build.version.release]: [1.5]
[ro.build.date]: [Mon Apr 20 01:42:32 CDT 2009]
[ro.build.date.utc]: [1240209752]
[ro.build.type]: [eng]
[ro.build.user]: [TheDude]
[ro.build.host]: [ender]
[ro.build.tags]: [test-keys]
[ro.build.product]: [dream]
[ro.build.description]: [kila-user 1.1 PLAT-RC33 126986 ota-rel-keys,release-keys]
[ro.build.fingerprint]: [tmobile/kila/dream/trout:1.1/PLAT-RC33/126986:user/ota-rel-keys,release-keys]
[ro.build.changelist]: [17615# end build properties]
另一方面，来自1.5 SDK的模拟器，运行1.5镜像，也有根，可能类似于Android Dev Phone 1(你可能想要允许)，并有这个:
cmb@apollo:~$ adb -e shell getprop |grep build
[ro.build.id]: [CUPCAKE]
[ro.build.display.id]: [sdk-eng 1.5 CUPCAKE 148875 test-keys]
[ro.build.version.incremental]: [148875]
[ro.build.version.sdk]: [3]
[ro.build.version.release]: [1.5]
[ro.build.date]: [Thu May 14 18:09:10 PDT 2009]
[ro.build.date.utc]: [1242349750]
[ro.build.type]: [eng]
[ro.build.user]: [android-build]
[ro.build.host]: [undroid16.mtv.corp.google.com]
[ro.build.tags]: [test-keys]
[ro.build.product]: [generic]
[ro.build.description]: [sdk-eng 1.5 CUPCAKE 148875 test-keys]
[ro.build.fingerprint]: [generic/sdk/generic/:1.5/CUPCAKE/148875:eng/test-keys]
至于零售构建，我手头没有，但在site:xda developers.com下的各种搜索提供了大量信息。这是荷兰的G1, ro。build。tags没有test-key，我认为这可能是最可靠的属性。
另外两个方法，如果你想检查一个设备在你的应用程序中是否具有根功能:
检查是否存在“su”二进制文件:从Runtime.getRuntime().exec()运行"which su" 在/system/app/ SuperUser.apk目录下查找SuperUser.apk
以下是我的代码，基于这里的一些答案:
/**
* Checks if the phone is rooted.
*
* @return <code>true</code> if the phone is rooted, <code>false</code>
* otherwise.
*/
public static boolean isPhoneRooted() {
// get from build info
String buildTags = android.os.Build.TAGS;
if (buildTags != null && buildTags.contains("test-keys")) {
return true;
}
// check if /system/app/Superuser.apk is present
try {
File file = new File("/system/app/Superuser.apk");
if (file.exists()) {
return true;
}
} catch (Throwable e1) {
// ignore
}
return false;
}
下面是一个类，它将以三种方式之一检查Root。
/** @author Kevin Kowalewski */
public class RootUtil {
public static boolean isDeviceRooted() {
return checkRootMethod1() || checkRootMethod2() || checkRootMethod3();
}
private static boolean checkRootMethod1() {
String buildTags = android.os.Build.TAGS;
return buildTags != null && buildTags.contains("test-keys");
}
private static boolean checkRootMethod2() {
String[] paths = { "/system/app/Superuser.apk", "/sbin/su", "/system/bin/su", "/system/xbin/su", "/data/local/xbin/su", "/data/local/bin/su", "/system/sd/xbin/su",
"/system/bin/failsafe/su", "/data/local/su", "/su/bin/su"};
for (String path : paths) {
if (new File(path).exists()) return true;
}
return false;
}
private static boolean checkRootMethod3() {
Process process = null;
try {
process = Runtime.getRuntime().exec(new String[] { "/system/xbin/which", "su" });
BufferedReader in = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(process.getInputStream()));
if (in.readLine() != null) return true;
return false;
} catch (Throwable t) {
return false;
} finally {
if (process != null) process.destroy();
}
}
}
你可以使用isAccessGiven()代替isRootAvailable()。直接从RootTools wiki:
if (RootTools.isAccessGiven()) {
// your app has been granted root access
}
RootTools.isAccessGiven()不仅检查设备是否已根，它还检查设备是否已根 也为你的应用程序调用su，请求权限，如果返回true 您的应用程序已成功授予根权限。可以使用这个 作为在你的应用程序中的第一个检查，以确保你将被授予 在需要的时候访问。
参考
在我的应用程序中，我通过执行“su”命令检查设备是否根。但是今天我删除了这部分代码。为什么?
因为我的应用程序成了内存杀手。怎么做?让我告诉你我的故事。
There were some complaints that my application was slowing down devices(Of course I thought that can not be true). I tried to figure out why. So I used MAT to get heap dumps and analyze, and everything seemed perfect. But after relaunching my app many times I realized that device is really getting slower and stopping my application didn't make it faster (unless I restart device). I analyzed dump files again while device is very slow. But everything was still perfect for dump file. Then I did what must be done at first. I listed processes.
$ adb shell ps
使震惊;我的应用程序有许多进程(应用程序的进程标签在manifest上)。有些是僵尸，有些不是。
对于一个只有一个Activity并只执行“su”命令的示例应用程序，我意识到在每次启动应用程序时都会创建一个僵尸进程。起初，这些僵尸进程分配0KB，但后来发生了一些事情，僵尸进程与我的应用程序的主进程占用了几乎相同的kb，它们成为了标准进程。
在bugs.sun.com: http://bugs.sun.com/view_bug.do?bug_id=6474073上有一个关于相同问题的错误报告，这解释了如果命令没有找到，将使用exec()方法创建僵尸。但我仍然不明白它们为什么以及如何成为标准流程并保持重要的kb。(这并不是一直都在发生)
你可以尝试如果你想下面的代码示例;
String commandToExecute = "su";
executeShellCommand(commandToExecute);
简单的命令执行方法;
private boolean executeShellCommand(String command){
Process process = null;
try{
process = Runtime.getRuntime().exec(command);
return true;
} catch (Exception e) {
return false;
} finally{
if(process != null){
try{
process.destroy();
}catch (Exception e) {
}
}
}
}
总结:总结;我没有建议你确定设备是否扎根。但如果我是你，我不会使用Runtime.getRuntime().exec()。
顺便说一下;RootTools.isRootAvailable()也会引起同样的问题。
除了@Kevins的回答之外，我最近在使用他的系统时发现，Nexus 7.1对所有三个方法都返回false——没有哪个命令，没有测试键，SuperSU没有安装在/system/app中。
我补充说:
public static boolean checkRootMethod4(Context context) {
return isPackageInstalled("eu.chainfire.supersu", context);
}
private static boolean isPackageInstalled(String packagename, Context context) {
PackageManager pm = context.getPackageManager();
try {
pm.getPackageInfo(packagename, PackageManager.GET_ACTIVITIES);
return true;
} catch (NameNotFoundException e) {
return false;
}
}
这在某些情况下有点不太有用(如果你需要保证root访问)，因为SuperSU完全有可能安装在没有SU访问的设备上。
然而，由于SuperSU可以安装并工作，但不在/system/app目录下，这个额外的情况将会根除(哈哈)这样的情况。
这确实是一个有趣的问题，到目前为止还没有人获奖。我使用以下代码:
boolean isRooted() {
try {
ServerSocket ss = new ServerSocket(81);
ss.close();
return true;
} catch (Exception e) {
// not sure
}
return false;
}
代码当然不是无懈可击的，因为网络可能不可用，所以会出现异常。如果该方法返回true，则99%可以确定，否则只有50%不确定。网络权限也可能破坏解决方案。
http://code.google.com/p/roottools/
如果你不想使用jar文件，请使用下面的代码:
public static boolean findBinary(String binaryName) {
boolean found = false;
if (!found) {
String[] places = { "/sbin/", "/system/bin/", "/system/xbin/",
"/data/local/xbin/", "/data/local/bin/",
"/system/sd/xbin/", "/system/bin/failsafe/", "/data/local/" };
for (String where : places) {
if (new File(where + binaryName).exists()) {
found = true;
break;
}
}
}
return found;
}
程序将尝试查找su文件夹:
private static boolean isRooted() {
return findBinary("su");
}
例子:
if (isRooted()) {
textView.setText("Device Rooted");
} else {
textView.setText("Device Unrooted");
}
在rootbox中使用我的库非常简单。检查所需的代码如下:
//Pass true to <Shell>.start(...) call to run as superuser
Shell shell = null;
try {
shell = Shell.start(true);
} catch (IOException exception) {
exception.printStackTrace();
}
if (shell == null)
// We failed to execute su binary
return;
if (shell.isRoot()) {
// Verified running as uid 0 (root), can continue with commands
...
} else
throw Exception("Unable to gain root access. Make sure you pressed Allow/Grant in superuser prompt.");
public static boolean isRootAvailable(){
Process p = null;
try{
p = Runtime.getRuntime().exec(new String[] {"su"});
writeCommandToConsole(p,"exit 0");
int result = p.waitFor();
if(result != 0)
throw new Exception("Root check result with exit command " + result);
return true;
} catch (IOException e) {
Log.e(LOG_TAG, "Su executable is not available ", e);
} catch (Exception e) {
Log.e(LOG_TAG, "Root is unavailable ", e);
}finally {
if(p != null)
p.destroy();
}
return false;
}
private static String writeCommandToConsole(Process proc, String command, boolean ignoreError) throws Exception{
byte[] tmpArray = new byte[1024];
proc.getOutputStream().write((command + "\n").getBytes());
proc.getOutputStream().flush();
int bytesRead = 0;
if(proc.getErrorStream().available() > 0){
if((bytesRead = proc.getErrorStream().read(tmpArray)) > 1){
Log.e(LOG_TAG,new String(tmpArray,0,bytesRead));
if(!ignoreError)
throw new Exception(new String(tmpArray,0,bytesRead));
}
}
if(proc.getInputStream().available() > 0){
bytesRead = proc.getInputStream().read(tmpArray);
Log.i(LOG_TAG, new String(tmpArray,0,bytesRead));
}
return new String(tmpArray);
}
if [[ "`adb shell which su | grep -io "permission denied"`" != "permission denied" ]]; then
echo "Yes. Rooted device."
else
echo "No. Device not rooted. Only limited tasks can be performed. Done."
zenity --warning --title="Device Not Rooted" --text="The connected Android Device is <b>NOT ROOTED</b>. Only limited tasks can be performed." --no-wrap
fi
如果你已经在使用Fabric/Firebase Crashlytics，你可以打电话
CommonUtils.isRooted(context)
这是该方法的当前实现:
public static boolean isRooted(Context context) {
boolean isEmulator = isEmulator(context);
String buildTags = Build.TAGS;
if (!isEmulator && buildTags != null && buildTags.contains("test-keys")) {
return true;
} else {
File file = new File("/system/app/Superuser.apk");
if (file.exists()) {
return true;
} else {
file = new File("/system/xbin/su");
return !isEmulator && file.exists();
}
}
}
public static boolean isEmulator(Context context) {
String androidId = Secure.getString(context.getContentResolver(), "android_id");
return "sdk".equals(Build.PRODUCT) || "google_sdk".equals(Build.PRODUCT) || androidId == null;
}
Java级别的根检查不是一个安全的解决方案。如果您的应用程序在root设备上运行有安全问题，那么请使用此解决方案。
凯文的答案是有效的，除非手机也有像RootCloak这样的应用程序。这样的应用程序有一个对Java api的句柄，一旦手机是根的，他们模仿这些api来返回手机不是根的。
我已经写了一个原生级别的代码基于凯文的答案，它甚至与RootCloak !此外，它不会导致任何内存泄漏问题。
#include <string.h>
#include <jni.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include "android_log.h"
#include <errno.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/system_properties.h>
JNIEXPORT int JNICALL Java_com_test_RootUtils_checkRootAccessMethod1(
JNIEnv* env, jobject thiz) {
//Access function checks whether a particular file can be accessed
int result = access("/system/app/Superuser.apk",F_OK);
ANDROID_LOGV( "File Access Result %d\n", result);
int len;
char build_tags[PROP_VALUE_MAX]; // PROP_VALUE_MAX from <sys/system_properties.h>.
len = __system_property_get(ANDROID_OS_BUILD_TAGS, build_tags); // On return, len will equal (int)strlen(model_id).
if(strcmp(build_tags,"test-keys") == 0){
ANDROID_LOGV( "Device has test keys\n", build_tags);
result = 0;
}
ANDROID_LOGV( "File Access Result %s\n", build_tags);
return result;
}
JNIEXPORT int JNICALL Java_com_test_RootUtils_checkRootAccessMethod2(
JNIEnv* env, jobject thiz) {
//which command is enabled only after Busy box is installed on a rooted device
//Outpput of which command is the path to su file. On a non rooted device , we will get a null/ empty path
//char* cmd = const_cast<char *>"which su";
FILE* pipe = popen("which su", "r");
if (!pipe) return -1;
char buffer[128];
std::string resultCmd = "";
while(!feof(pipe)) {
if(fgets(buffer, 128, pipe) != NULL)
resultCmd += buffer;
}
pclose(pipe);
const char *cstr = resultCmd.c_str();
int result = -1;
if(cstr == NULL || (strlen(cstr) == 0)){
ANDROID_LOGV( "Result of Which command is Null");
}else{
result = 0;
ANDROID_LOGV( "Result of Which command %s\n", cstr);
}
return result;
}
JNIEXPORT int JNICALL Java_com_test_RootUtils_checkRootAccessMethod3(
JNIEnv* env, jobject thiz) {
int len;
char build_tags[PROP_VALUE_MAX]; // PROP_VALUE_MAX from <sys/system_properties.h>.
int result = -1;
len = __system_property_get(ANDROID_OS_BUILD_TAGS, build_tags); // On return, len will equal (int)strlen(model_id).
if(len >0 && strstr(build_tags,"test-keys") != NULL){
ANDROID_LOGV( "Device has test keys\n", build_tags);
result = 0;
}
return result;
}
在Java代码中，需要创建包装器类RootUtils来进行本机调用
public boolean checkRooted() {
if( rootUtils.checkRootAccessMethod3() == 0 || rootUtils.checkRootAccessMethod1() == 0 || rootUtils.checkRootAccessMethod2() == 0 )
return true;
return false;
}
这里列出的许多答案都有内在的问题:
Checking for test-keys is correlated with root access but doesn't necessarily guarantee it "PATH" directories should be derived from the actual "PATH" environment variable instead of being hard coded The existence of the "su" executable doesn't necessarily mean the device has been rooted The "which" executable may or may not be installed, and you should let the system resolve its path if possible Just because the SuperUser app is installed on the device does not mean the device has root access yet
Stericson的RootTools库似乎可以更合理地检查root。它还有很多额外的工具和实用程序，所以我强烈推荐它。然而，并没有解释它是如何专门检查根目录的，而且它可能比大多数应用程序真正需要的要重一些。
我已经创建了几个基于RootTools库的实用程序方法。如果你只是想检查“su”可执行文件是否在设备上，你可以使用以下方法:
public static boolean isRootAvailable(){
for(String pathDir : System.getenv("PATH").split(":")){
if(new File(pathDir, "su").exists()) {
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
这个方法简单地遍历“PATH”环境变量中列出的目录，并检查其中是否存在“su”文件。
为了真正检查root访问权限，必须实际运行“su”命令。如果安装了一个像SuperUser这样的应用程序，那么在这一点上它可能会要求root访问，或者如果它已经被授予/拒绝，吐司可能会显示是否授予/拒绝访问。一个很好的命令是“id”，这样您可以验证用户id实际上是0(根)。
下面是一个示例方法来确定是否授予了根访问权:
public static boolean isRootGiven(){
if (isRootAvailable()) {
Process process = null;
try {
process = Runtime.getRuntime().exec(new String[]{"su", "-c", "id"});
BufferedReader in = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(process.getInputStream()));
String output = in.readLine();
if (output != null && output.toLowerCase().contains("uid=0"))
return true;
} catch (Exception e) {
e.printStackTrace();
} finally {
if (process != null)
process.destroy();
}
}
return false;
}
实际测试运行"su"命令是很重要的，因为一些模拟器已经预安装了"su"可执行文件，但只允许某些用户像adb shell一样访问它。
在尝试运行“su”可执行文件之前检查它的存在也是很重要的，因为android已经知道不会正确地处理试图运行缺失命令的进程。随着时间的推移，这些幽灵进程会消耗大量内存。
RootBeer是一个由Scott和Matthew开发的Android根检查库。 它使用各种检查来指示设备是否已根。
Java检查 CheckRootManagementApps CheckPotentiallyDangerousAppss CheckRootCloakingApps CheckTestKeys checkForDangerousProps checkForBusyBoxBinary checkForSuBinary checkSuExists checkForRWSystem 本地检查 我们调用本地根检查器来运行它自己的一些检查 检查。本地检查通常很难隐藏，所以一些根 斗篷应用程序只是阻止加载本机库包含 某些关键词。 checkForSuBinary
使用c++和ndk是最好的方法来检测根，即使用户使用的应用程序隐藏了他的根，如RootCloak。我用RootCloak测试了这段代码，即使用户试图隐藏它，我也能够检测到根。 所以你的cpp文件是这样的:
#include <jni.h>
#include <string>
/**
*
* function that checks for the su binary files and operates even if
* root cloak is installed
* @return integer 1: device is rooted, 0: device is not
*rooted
*/
extern "C"
JNIEXPORT int JNICALL
Java_com_example_user_root_1native_rootFunction(JNIEnv *env,jobject thiz){
const char *paths[] ={"/system/app/Superuser.apk", "/sbin/su", "/system/bin/su",
"/system/xbin/su", "/data/local/xbin/su", "/data/local/bin/su", "/system/sd/xbin/su",
"/system/bin/failsafe/su", "/data/local/su", "/su/bin/su"};
int counter =0;
while (counter<9){
if(FILE *file = fopen(paths[counter],"r")){
fclose(file);
return 1;
}
counter++;
}
return 0;
}
您将从java代码中调用该函数，如下所示
public class Root_detect {
/**
*
* function that calls a native function to check if the device is
*rooted or not
* @return boolean: true if the device is rooted, false if the
*device is not rooted
*/
public boolean check_rooted(){
int checker = rootFunction();
if(checker==1){
return true;
}else {
return false;
}
}
static {
System.loadLibrary("cpp-root-lib");//name of your cpp file
}
public native int rootFunction();
}
更新2017
你现在可以用谷歌Safetynet API做到这一点。SafetyNet API提供了认证API，它可以帮助您评估应用程序运行的Android环境的安全性和兼容性。
这种认证可以帮助确定特定设备是否被篡改或修改过。
认证API返回如下所示的JWS响应
{
"nonce": "R2Rra24fVm5xa2Mg",
"timestampMs": 9860437986543,
"apkPackageName": "com.package.name.of.requesting.app",
"apkCertificateDigestSha256": ["base64 encoded, SHA-256 hash of the
certificate used to sign requesting app"],
"apkDigestSha256": "base64 encoded, SHA-256 hash of the app's APK",
"ctsProfileMatch": true,
"basicIntegrity": true,
}
解析此响应可以帮助您确定设备是否已扎根
根设备似乎导致ctsProfileMatch=false。
您可以在客户端执行此操作，但建议在服务器端解析响应。 一个基本的客户端服务器架构与安全网API将看起来像这样
我建议使用本机代码进行根检测。 下面是一个完整的工作示例。
JAVA包装程序:
package com.kozhevin.rootchecks.util;
import android.support.annotation.NonNull;
import com.kozhevin.rootchecks.BuildConfig;
public class MeatGrinder {
private final static String LIB_NAME = "native-lib";
private static boolean isLoaded;
private static boolean isUnderTest = false;
private MeatGrinder() {
}
public boolean isLibraryLoaded() {
if (isLoaded) {
return true;
}
try {
if(isUnderTest) {
throw new UnsatisfiedLinkError("under test");
}
System.loadLibrary(LIB_NAME);
isLoaded = true;
} catch (UnsatisfiedLinkError e) {
if (BuildConfig.DEBUG) {
e.printStackTrace();
}
}
return isLoaded;
}
public native boolean isDetectedDevKeys();
public native boolean isDetectedTestKeys();
public native boolean isNotFoundReleaseKeys();
public native boolean isFoundDangerousProps();
public native boolean isPermissiveSelinux();
public native boolean isSuExists();
public native boolean isAccessedSuperuserApk();
public native boolean isFoundSuBinary();
public native boolean isFoundBusyboxBinary();
public native boolean isFoundXposed();
public native boolean isFoundResetprop();
public native boolean isFoundWrongPathPermission();
public native boolean isFoundHooks();
@NonNull
public static MeatGrinder getInstance() {
return InstanceHolder.INSTANCE;
}
private static class InstanceHolder {
private static final MeatGrinder INSTANCE = new MeatGrinder();
}
}
JNI包装器(native-lib.c):
JNIEXPORT jboolean JNICALL
Java_com_kozhevin_rootchecks_util_MeatGrinder_isDetectedTestKeys(
JNIEnv *env,
jobject this ) {
return (jboolean) isDetectedTestKeys();
}
JNIEXPORT jboolean JNICALL
Java_com_kozhevin_rootchecks_util_MeatGrinder_isDetectedDevKeys(
JNIEnv *env,
jobject this ) {
return (jboolean) isDetectedDevKeys();
}
JNIEXPORT jboolean JNICALL
Java_com_kozhevin_rootchecks_util_MeatGrinder_isNotFoundReleaseKeys(
JNIEnv *env,
jobject this ) {
return (jboolean) isNotFoundReleaseKeys();
}
JNIEXPORT jboolean JNICALL
Java_com_kozhevin_rootchecks_util_MeatGrinder_isFoundDangerousProps(
JNIEnv *env,
jobject this ) {
return (jboolean) isFoundDangerousProps();
}
JNIEXPORT jboolean JNICALL
Java_com_kozhevin_rootchecks_util_MeatGrinder_isPermissiveSelinux(
JNIEnv *env,
jobject this ) {
return (jboolean) isPermissiveSelinux();
}
JNIEXPORT jboolean JNICALL
Java_com_kozhevin_rootchecks_util_MeatGrinder_isSuExists(
JNIEnv *env,
jobject this ) {
return (jboolean) isSuExists();
}
JNIEXPORT jboolean JNICALL
Java_com_kozhevin_rootchecks_util_MeatGrinder_isAccessedSuperuserApk(
JNIEnv *env,
jobject this ) {
return (jboolean) isAccessedSuperuserApk();
}
JNIEXPORT jboolean JNICALL
Java_com_kozhevin_rootchecks_util_MeatGrinder_isFoundSuBinary(
JNIEnv *env,
jobject this ) {
return (jboolean) isFoundSuBinary();
}
JNIEXPORT jboolean JNICALL
Java_com_kozhevin_rootchecks_util_MeatGrinder_isFoundBusyboxBinary(
JNIEnv *env,
jobject this ) {
return (jboolean) isFoundBusyboxBinary();
}
JNIEXPORT jboolean JNICALL
Java_com_kozhevin_rootchecks_util_MeatGrinder_isFoundXposed(
JNIEnv *env,
jobject this ) {
return (jboolean) isFoundXposed();
}
JNIEXPORT jboolean JNICALL
Java_com_kozhevin_rootchecks_util_MeatGrinder_isFoundResetprop(
JNIEnv *env,
jobject this ) {
return (jboolean) isFoundResetprop();
}
JNIEXPORT jboolean JNICALL
Java_com_kozhevin_rootchecks_util_MeatGrinder_isFoundWrongPathPermission(
JNIEnv *env,
jobject this ) {
return (jboolean) isFoundWrongPathPermission();
}
JNIEXPORT jboolean JNICALL
Java_com_kozhevin_rootchecks_util_MeatGrinder_isFoundHooks(
JNIEnv *env,
jobject this ) {
return (jboolean) isFoundHooks();
}
常量:
// Comma-separated tags describing the build, like= "unsigned,debug".
const char *const ANDROID_OS_BUILD_TAGS = "ro.build.tags";
// A string that uniquely identifies this build. 'BRAND/PRODUCT/DEVICE:RELEASE/ID/VERSION.INCREMENTAL:TYPE/TAGS'.
const char *const ANDROID_OS_BUILD_FINGERPRINT = "ro.build.fingerprint";
const char *const ANDROID_OS_SECURE = "ro.secure";
const char *const ANDROID_OS_DEBUGGABLE = "ro.debuggable";
const char *const ANDROID_OS_SYS_INITD = "sys.initd";
const char *const ANDROID_OS_BUILD_SELINUX = "ro.build.selinux";
//see https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/core/+/master/adb/services.cpp#86
const char *const SERVICE_ADB_ROOT = "service.adb.root";
const char * const MG_SU_PATH[] = {
"/data/local/",
"/data/local/bin/",
"/data/local/xbin/",
"/sbin/",
"/system/bin/",
"/system/bin/.ext/",
"/system/bin/failsafe/",
"/system/sd/xbin/",
"/su/xbin/",
"/su/bin/",
"/magisk/.core/bin/",
"/system/usr/we-need-root/",
"/system/xbin/",
0
};
const char * const MG_EXPOSED_FILES[] = {
"/system/lib/libxposed_art.so",
"/system/lib64/libxposed_art.so",
"/system/xposed.prop",
"/cache/recovery/xposed.zip",
"/system/framework/XposedBridge.jar",
"/system/bin/app_process64_xposed",
"/system/bin/app_process32_xposed",
"/magisk/xposed/system/lib/libsigchain.so",
"/magisk/xposed/system/lib/libart.so",
"/magisk/xposed/system/lib/libart-disassembler.so",
"/magisk/xposed/system/lib/libart-compiler.so",
"/system/bin/app_process32_orig",
"/system/bin/app_process64_orig",
0
};
const char * const MG_READ_ONLY_PATH[] = {
"/system",
"/system/bin",
"/system/sbin",
"/system/xbin",
"/vendor/bin",
"/sbin",
"/etc",
0
};
本地代码的根检测:
struct mntent *getMntent(FILE *fp, struct mntent *e, char *buf, int buf_len) {
while (fgets(buf, buf_len, fp) != NULL) {
// Entries look like "/dev/block/vda /system ext4 ro,seclabel,relatime,data=ordered 0 0".
// That is: mnt_fsname mnt_dir mnt_type mnt_opts mnt_freq mnt_passno.
int fsname0, fsname1, dir0, dir1, type0, type1, opts0, opts1;
if (sscanf(buf, " %n%*s%n %n%*s%n %n%*s%n %n%*s%n %d %d",
&fsname0, &fsname1, &dir0, &dir1, &type0, &type1, &opts0, &opts1,
&e->mnt_freq, &e->mnt_passno) == 2) {
e->mnt_fsname = &buf[fsname0];
buf[fsname1] = '\0';
e->mnt_dir = &buf[dir0];
buf[dir1] = '\0';
e->mnt_type = &buf[type0];
buf[type1] = '\0';
e->mnt_opts = &buf[opts0];
buf[opts1] = '\0';
return e;
}
}
return NULL;
}
bool isPresentMntOpt(const struct mntent *pMnt, const char *pOpt) {
char *token = pMnt->mnt_opts;
const char *end = pMnt->mnt_opts + strlen(pMnt->mnt_opts);
const size_t optLen = strlen(pOpt);
while (token != NULL) {
const char *tokenEnd = token + optLen;
if (tokenEnd > end) break;
if (memcmp(token, pOpt, optLen) == 0 &&
(*tokenEnd == '\0' || *tokenEnd == ',' || *tokenEnd == '=')) {
return true;
}
token = strchr(token, ',');
if (token != NULL) {
token++;
}
}
return false;
}
static char *concat2str(const char *pString1, const char *pString2) {
char *result;
size_t lengthBuffer = 0;
lengthBuffer = strlen(pString1) +
strlen(pString2) + 1;
result = malloc(lengthBuffer);
if (result == NULL) {
GR_LOGW("malloc failed\n");
return NULL;
}
memset(result, 0, lengthBuffer);
strcpy(result, pString1);
strcat(result, pString2);
return result;
}
static bool
isBadPropertyState(const char *key, const char *badValue, bool isObligatoryProperty, bool isExact) {
if (badValue == NULL) {
GR_LOGE("badValue may not be NULL");
return false;
}
if (key == NULL) {
GR_LOGE("key may not be NULL");
return false;
}
char value[PROP_VALUE_MAX + 1];
int length = __system_property_get(key, value);
bool result = false;
/* A length 0 value indicates that the property is not defined */
if (length > 0) {
GR_LOGI("property:[%s]==[%s]", key, value);
if (isExact) {
if (strcmp(value, badValue) == 0) {
GR_LOGW("bad value[%s] equals to [%s] in the property [%s]", value, badValue, key);
result = true;
}
} else {
if (strlen(value) >= strlen(badValue) && strstr(value, badValue) != NULL) {
GR_LOGW("bad value[%s] found in [%s] in the property [%s]", value, badValue, key);
result = true;
}
}
} else {
GR_LOGI("[%s] property not found", key);
if (isObligatoryProperty) {
result = true;
}
}
return result;
}
bool isDetectedTestKeys() {
const char *TEST_KEYS_VALUE = "test-keys";
return isBadPropertyState(ANDROID_OS_BUILD_TAGS, TEST_KEYS_VALUE, true, false);
}
bool isDetectedDevKeys() {
const char *DEV_KEYS_VALUE = "dev-keys";
return isBadPropertyState(ANDROID_OS_BUILD_TAGS, DEV_KEYS_VALUE, true, false);
}
bool isNotFoundReleaseKeys() {
const char *RELEASE_KEYS_VALUE = "release-keys";
return !isBadPropertyState(ANDROID_OS_BUILD_TAGS, RELEASE_KEYS_VALUE, false, true);
}
bool isFoundWrongPathPermission() {
bool result = false;
FILE *file = fopen("/proc/mounts", "r");
char mntent_strings[BUFSIZ];
if (file == NULL) {
GR_LOGE("setmntent");
return result;
}
struct mntent ent = {0};
while (NULL != getMntent(file, &ent, mntent_strings, sizeof(mntent_strings))) {
for (size_t i = 0; MG_READ_ONLY_PATH[i]; i++) {
if (strcmp((&ent)->mnt_dir, MG_READ_ONLY_PATH[i]) == 0 &&
isPresentMntOpt(&ent, "rw")) {
GR_LOGI("%s %s %s %s\n", (&ent)->mnt_fsname, (&ent)->mnt_dir, (&ent)->mnt_opts,
(&ent)->mnt_type);
result = true;
break;
}
}
memset(&ent, 0, sizeof(ent));
}
fclose(file);
return result;
}
bool isFoundDangerousProps() {
const char *BAD_DEBUGGABLE_VALUE = "1";
const char *BAD_SECURE_VALUE = "0";
const char *BAD_SYS_INITD_VALUE = "1";
const char *BAD_SERVICE_ADB_ROOT_VALUE = "1";
bool result = isBadPropertyState(ANDROID_OS_DEBUGGABLE, BAD_DEBUGGABLE_VALUE, true, true) ||
isBadPropertyState(SERVICE_ADB_ROOT, BAD_SERVICE_ADB_ROOT_VALUE, false, true) ||
isBadPropertyState(ANDROID_OS_SECURE, BAD_SECURE_VALUE, true, true) ||
isBadPropertyState(ANDROID_OS_SYS_INITD, BAD_SYS_INITD_VALUE, false, true);
return result;
}
bool isPermissiveSelinux() {
const char *BAD_VALUE = "0";
return isBadPropertyState(ANDROID_OS_BUILD_SELINUX, BAD_VALUE, false, false);
}
bool isSuExists() {
char buf[BUFSIZ];
char *str = NULL;
char *temp = NULL;
size_t size = 1; // start with size of 1 to make room for null terminator
size_t strlength;
FILE *pipe = popen("which su", "r");
if (pipe == NULL) {
GR_LOGI("pipe is null");
return false;
}
while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), pipe) != NULL) {
strlength = strlen(buf);
temp = realloc(str, size + strlength); // allocate room for the buf that gets appended
if (temp == NULL) {
// allocation error
GR_LOGE("Error (re)allocating memory");
pclose(pipe);
if (str != NULL) {
free(str);
}
return false;
} else {
str = temp;
}
strcpy(str + size - 1, buf);
size += strlength;
}
pclose(pipe);
GR_LOGW("A size of the result from pipe is [%zu], result:\n [%s] ", size, str);
if (str != NULL) {
free(str);
}
return size > 1 ? true : false;
}
static bool isAccessedFile(const char *path) {
int result = access(path, F_OK);
GR_LOGV("[%s] has been accessed with result: [%d]", path, result);
return result == 0 ? true : false;
}
static bool isFoundBinaryFromArray(const char *const *array, const char *binary) {
for (size_t i = 0; array[i]; ++i) {
char *checkedPath = concat2str(array[i], binary);
if (checkedPath == NULL) { // malloc failed
return false;
}
bool result = isAccessedFile(checkedPath);
free(checkedPath);
if (result) {
return result;
}
}
return false;
}
bool isAccessedSuperuserApk() {
return isAccessedFile("/system/app/Superuser.apk");
}
bool isFoundResetprop() {
return isAccessedFile("/data/magisk/resetprop");
}
bool isFoundSuBinary() {
return isFoundBinaryFromArray(MG_SU_PATH, "su");
}
bool isFoundBusyboxBinary() {
return isFoundBinaryFromArray(MG_SU_PATH, "busybox");
}
bool isFoundXposed() {
for (size_t i = 0; MG_EXPOSED_FILES[i]; ++i) {
bool result = isAccessedFile(MG_EXPOSED_FILES[i]);
if (result) {
return result;
}
}
return false;
}
bool isFoundHooks() {
bool result = false;
pid_t pid = getpid();
char maps_file_name[512];
sprintf(maps_file_name, "/proc/%d/maps", pid);
GR_LOGI("try to open [%s]", maps_file_name);
const size_t line_size = BUFSIZ;
char *line = malloc(line_size);
if (line == NULL) {
return result;
}
FILE *fp = fopen(maps_file_name, "r");
if (fp == NULL) {
free(line);
return result;
}
memset(line, 0, line_size);
const char *substrate = "com.saurik.substrate";
const char *xposed = "XposedBridge.jar";
while (fgets(line, line_size, fp) != NULL) {
const size_t real_line_size = strlen(line);
if ((real_line_size >= strlen(substrate) && strstr(line, substrate) != NULL) ||
(real_line_size >= strlen(xposed) && strstr(line, xposed) != NULL)) {
GR_LOGI("found in [%s]: [%s]", maps_file_name, line);
result = true;
break;
}
}
free(line);
fclose(fp);
return result;
}
谷歌播放服务有安全网络认证API，通过它我们可以评估设备，并确定它是否被根/篡改。
请通过我的回答来处理根设备: https://stackoverflow.com/a/58304556/3908895
忘记所有那些检测根应用程序和子二进制文件。检查根守护进程。这可以从终端完成，你可以在应用程序中运行终端命令。试试这一行。
if [ ! "$(/system/bin/ps -A | grep -v grep | grep -c daemonsu)" = "0" ]; then echo "device is rooted"; else echo "device is not rooted"; fi
您也不需要root权限来实现这一点。
编辑:现在使用这种方法更好的检测!
if [ $(ps -A | grep -e ^shell -e ^root | grep -v "\[" | tr -s ' ' | cut -d ' ' -f 9 | grep -c su) ] || [ $(which su) ]; then echo 'rooted'; else echo 'not rooted'; fi
你可以通过以下代码来做到这一点:
public boolean getRootInfo() {
if (checkRootFiles() || checkTags()) {
return true;
}
return false;
}
private boolean checkRootFiles() {
boolean root = false;
String[] paths = {"/system/app/Superuser.apk", "/sbin/su", "/system/bin/su", "/system/xbin/su", "/data/local/xbin/su", "/data/local/bin/su", "/system/sd/xbin/su",
"/system/bin/failsafe/su", "/data/local/su", "/su/bin/su"};
for (String path : paths) {
root = new File(path).exists();
if (root)
break;
}
return root;
}
private boolean checkTags() {
String tag = Build.TAGS;
return tag != null && tag.trim().contains("test-keys");
}
你也可以检查RootBeer这个库。
如果你不想使用任何第三方库或任何随机解决方案，那么就使用谷歌库来检测它。
Android设备验证
回应:
{
"timestampMs": 9860437986543,
"nonce": "R2Rra24fVm5xa2Mg",
"apkPackageName": "com.package.name.of.requesting.app",
"apkCertificateDigestSha256": ["base64 encoded, SHA-256 hash of the
certificate used to sign requesting app"],
"ctsProfileMatch": true,
"basicIntegrity": true,
}
ctsprofilmatch如果设备已根，则给出false。
参考链接: [1]: https://developer.android.com/training/safetynet/attestation
根据这里的一些答案，我合并了它们，并添加了一个检查是否安装了一些已知的根管理器应用程序:
fun isProbablyRooted(context: Context, alsoIncludeCheckingRootManagerApp: Boolean = false): Boolean {
return hasRootManagerSystemApp(context) || (alsoIncludeCheckingRootManagerApp && hasRootManagerSystemApp(context))
}
fun hasRootManagerSystemApp(context: Context): Boolean {
val rootAppsPackageNames = arrayOf("com.topjohnwu.magisk", "eu.chainfire.supersu", "com.koushikdutta.superuser", "com.noshufou.android.su", "me.phh.superuser")
rootAppsPackageNames.forEach { rootAppPackageName ->
try {
context.packageManager.getApplicationInfo(rootAppPackageName, 0)
return true
} catch (e: Exception) {
}
}
return false
}
fun hasSuBinary(): Boolean {
return try {
findBinary("su")
} catch (e: Exception) {
e.printStackTrace()
false
}
}
private fun findBinary(binaryName: String): Boolean {
val paths = System.getenv("PATH")
if (!paths.isNullOrBlank()) {
val systemPlaces: List<String> = paths.split(":")
return systemPlaces.firstOrNull { File(it, binaryName).exists() } != null
}
val places = arrayOf("/sbin/", "/system/bin/", "/system/xbin/", "/data/local/xbin/", "/data/local/bin/",
"/system/sd/xbin/", "/system/bin/failsafe/", "/data/local/")
return places.firstOrNull { File(it, binaryName).exists() } != null
}
清单:
<queries>
<package android:name="com.topjohnwu.magisk" />
<package android:name="eu.chainfire.supersu" />
<package android:name="com.koushikdutta.superuser" />
<package android:name="com.noshufou.android.su" />
<package android:name="me.phh.superuser" />
</queries>
当然，这仍然是一个猜测，就像所有其他解一样。 例如，用户可以安装Magisk，而无需对设备进行root操作。
使用谷歌SafetyNet认证API，您可以轻松检查您的设备是否已根:
Add dependency in build.gradle(:app) implementation 'com.google.android.gms:play-services-safetynet:17.0.0' Get Api key and enable Android Device Verification API using link public static void sendSafetyNetRequest(Activity context) { if(GoogleApiAvailability.getInstance().isGooglePlayServicesAvailable(context, 13000000) == ConnectionResult.SUCCESS) { Log.e(TAG, "The SafetyNet Attestation API is available"); // TODO(developer): Change the nonce generation to include your own, used once value, // ideally from your remote server. String nonceData = "Safety Net Sample: " + System.currentTimeMillis(); ByteArrayOutputStream byteStream = new ByteArrayOutputStream(); Random mRandom = new SecureRandom(); byte[] bytes = new byte[24]; mRandom.nextBytes(bytes); try { byteStream.write(bytes); byteStream.write(nonceData.getBytes()); } catch (IOException e) { e.printStackTrace(); } byte[] nonce = byteStream.toByteArray(); SafetyNetClient client = SafetyNet.getClient(context); Task<SafetyNetApi.AttestationResponse> task = client.attest(nonce, API_KEY_FROM_STEP_2_LINK); task.addOnSuccessListener(context, attestationResponse -> { /* TODO(developer): Forward this result to your server together with the nonce for verification. You can also parse the JwsResult locally to confirm that the API returned a response by checking for an 'error' field first and before retrying the request with an exponential backoff. NOTE: Do NOT rely on a local, client-side only check for security, you must verify the response on a remote server! */ String jwsResult = attestationResponse.getJwsResult(); Log.e(TAG, "Success! SafetyNet result:\n" + jwsResult + "\n"); if (jwsResult == null) { Log.e(TAG, "jwsResult Null"); } final String[] jwtParts = jwsResult.split("\\."); if (jwtParts.length == 3) { String decodedPayload = new String(Base64.decode(jwtParts[1], Base64.DEFAULT)); Log.e(TAG, "decodedPayload : " + decodedPayload); } }); task.addOnFailureListener(context, e -> { // An error occurred while communicating with the service. String mResult = null; if (e instanceof ApiException) { // An error with the Google Play Services API contains some additional details. ApiException apiException = (ApiException) e; Util.showLog(TAG, "Error: " + CommonStatusCodes.getStatusCodeString(apiException.getStatusCode()) + ": " + apiException.getStatusMessage()); } else { // A different, unknown type of error occurred. Log.e(TAG, "ERROR! " + e.getMessage()); } }); } else { Log.e(TAG, "Prompt user to update Google Play services."; } } ` Check your logs for decodedPayload if ctsProfileMatch and basicIntegrity both are false it means your device is rooted . The Attestation API returns a JWS response which looks like:
{"nonce": "6pLrr9zWyl6TNzj+kpbR4LZcfPY3U2FmZXR5IE5ldCBTYW1wbGU6IDE2MTQ2NzkwMTIzNjc="， " timestamms ": 9860437986543， "apkPackageName": "你的包名将显示在这里"，"ctsProfileMatch": true， "apkDigestSha256": ["base64编码，用于签名请求应用程序的证书的SHA-256哈希值"]，"basicIntegrity": true， "evaluationType": "BASIC"}
欲了解更多信息，请查看此链接。
截至2021年(今天)，似乎没有任何可靠的方法或方法来检测根目录，特别是在启用了MagiskHide等强大的隐藏工具的情况下。这里的大多数答案都不再相关，所以不要在生产中使用它。依靠可靠的检查，如SafetyNet，而不是额外的英里检测根，我建议在两个运行时保护你的应用程序，如防止调试器/检测，并确保使用混淆。
在2021年最后一个季度的今天，我试图使用SafetyNet来回答@HimanshiThakur的答案。但我有个问题，在这里提出了一个问题。还是没有回答。
所以我决定使用RootBeer。它工作得很好，但当Magisk隐藏根时，它就不起作用了。
如果你不在乎这种情况(许多银行应用程序也不能解决这个问题)，你可以使用以下步骤:
添加到Gradle:
implementation 'com.scottyab:rootbeer-lib:0.1.0'
用这些句子:
RootBeer rootBeer = new RootBeer(context);
if (rootBeer.isRooted()) {
//we found indication of root
} else {
//we didn't find indication of root
}
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