我的应用程序有一个特定的功能，只能在根可用的设备上工作。与其让这个特性在使用时失败(然后向用户显示适当的错误消息)，我更希望能够先静默地检查根目录是否可用，如果不可用，则首先隐藏相应的选项。
有办法做到这一点吗?
当前回答
一些用于设置系统属性ro的修改版本。Modversion用于此目的。事情似乎已经发生了变化;我几个月前在TheDude上的构建是这样的:
cmb@apollo:~$ adb -d shell getprop |grep build
[ro.build.id]: [CUPCAKE]
[ro.build.display.id]: [htc_dream-eng 1.5 CUPCAKE eng.TheDudeAbides.20090427.235325 test-keys]
[ro.build.version.incremental]: [eng.TheDude.2009027.235325]
[ro.build.version.sdk]: [3]
[ro.build.version.release]: [1.5]
[ro.build.date]: [Mon Apr 20 01:42:32 CDT 2009]
[ro.build.date.utc]: [1240209752]
[ro.build.type]: [eng]
[ro.build.user]: [TheDude]
[ro.build.host]: [ender]
[ro.build.tags]: [test-keys]
[ro.build.product]: [dream]
[ro.build.description]: [kila-user 1.1 PLAT-RC33 126986 ota-rel-keys,release-keys]
[ro.build.fingerprint]: [tmobile/kila/dream/trout:1.1/PLAT-RC33/126986:user/ota-rel-keys,release-keys]
[ro.build.changelist]: [17615# end build properties]
另一方面，来自1.5 SDK的模拟器，运行1.5镜像，也有根，可能类似于Android Dev Phone 1(你可能想要允许)，并有这个:
cmb@apollo:~$ adb -e shell getprop |grep build
[ro.build.id]: [CUPCAKE]
[ro.build.display.id]: [sdk-eng 1.5 CUPCAKE 148875 test-keys]
[ro.build.version.incremental]: [148875]
[ro.build.version.sdk]: [3]
[ro.build.version.release]: [1.5]
[ro.build.date]: [Thu May 14 18:09:10 PDT 2009]
[ro.build.date.utc]: [1242349750]
[ro.build.type]: [eng]
[ro.build.user]: [android-build]
[ro.build.host]: [undroid16.mtv.corp.google.com]
[ro.build.tags]: [test-keys]
[ro.build.product]: [generic]
[ro.build.description]: [sdk-eng 1.5 CUPCAKE 148875 test-keys]
[ro.build.fingerprint]: [generic/sdk/generic/:1.5/CUPCAKE/148875:eng/test-keys]
至于零售构建，我手头没有，但在site:xda developers.com下的各种搜索提供了大量信息。这是荷兰的G1, ro。build。tags没有test-key，我认为这可能是最可靠的属性。
其他回答
在我的应用程序中，我通过执行“su”命令检查设备是否根。但是今天我删除了这部分代码。为什么?
因为我的应用程序成了内存杀手。怎么做?让我告诉你我的故事。
There were some complaints that my application was slowing down devices(Of course I thought that can not be true). I tried to figure out why. So I used MAT to get heap dumps and analyze, and everything seemed perfect. But after relaunching my app many times I realized that device is really getting slower and stopping my application didn't make it faster (unless I restart device). I analyzed dump files again while device is very slow. But everything was still perfect for dump file. Then I did what must be done at first. I listed processes.
$ adb shell ps
使震惊;我的应用程序有许多进程(应用程序的进程标签在manifest上)。有些是僵尸，有些不是。
对于一个只有一个Activity并只执行“su”命令的示例应用程序，我意识到在每次启动应用程序时都会创建一个僵尸进程。起初，这些僵尸进程分配0KB，但后来发生了一些事情，僵尸进程与我的应用程序的主进程占用了几乎相同的kb，它们成为了标准进程。
在bugs.sun.com: http://bugs.sun.com/view_bug.do?bug_id=6474073上有一个关于相同问题的错误报告，这解释了如果命令没有找到，将使用exec()方法创建僵尸。但我仍然不明白它们为什么以及如何成为标准流程并保持重要的kb。(这并不是一直都在发生)
你可以尝试如果你想下面的代码示例;
String commandToExecute = "su";
executeShellCommand(commandToExecute);
简单的命令执行方法;
private boolean executeShellCommand(String command){
Process process = null;
try{
process = Runtime.getRuntime().exec(command);
return true;
} catch (Exception e) {
return false;
} finally{
if(process != null){
try{
process.destroy();
}catch (Exception e) {
}
}
}
}
总结:总结;我没有建议你确定设备是否扎根。但如果我是你，我不会使用Runtime.getRuntime().exec()。
顺便说一下;RootTools.isRootAvailable()也会引起同样的问题。
更新2017
你现在可以用谷歌Safetynet API做到这一点。SafetyNet API提供了认证API，它可以帮助您评估应用程序运行的Android环境的安全性和兼容性。
这种认证可以帮助确定特定设备是否被篡改或修改过。
认证API返回如下所示的JWS响应
{
"nonce": "R2Rra24fVm5xa2Mg",
"timestampMs": 9860437986543,
"apkPackageName": "com.package.name.of.requesting.app",
"apkCertificateDigestSha256": ["base64 encoded, SHA-256 hash of the
certificate used to sign requesting app"],
"apkDigestSha256": "base64 encoded, SHA-256 hash of the app's APK",
"ctsProfileMatch": true,
"basicIntegrity": true,
}
解析此响应可以帮助您确定设备是否已扎根
根设备似乎导致ctsProfileMatch=false。
您可以在客户端执行此操作，但建议在服务器端解析响应。 一个基本的客户端服务器架构与安全网API将看起来像这样
一些用于设置系统属性ro的修改版本。Modversion用于此目的。事情似乎已经发生了变化;我几个月前在TheDude上的构建是这样的:
cmb@apollo:~$ adb -d shell getprop |grep build
[ro.build.id]: [CUPCAKE]
[ro.build.display.id]: [htc_dream-eng 1.5 CUPCAKE eng.TheDudeAbides.20090427.235325 test-keys]
[ro.build.version.incremental]: [eng.TheDude.2009027.235325]
[ro.build.version.sdk]: [3]
[ro.build.version.release]: [1.5]
[ro.build.date]: [Mon Apr 20 01:42:32 CDT 2009]
[ro.build.date.utc]: [1240209752]
[ro.build.type]: [eng]
[ro.build.user]: [TheDude]
[ro.build.host]: [ender]
[ro.build.tags]: [test-keys]
[ro.build.product]: [dream]
[ro.build.description]: [kila-user 1.1 PLAT-RC33 126986 ota-rel-keys,release-keys]
[ro.build.fingerprint]: [tmobile/kila/dream/trout:1.1/PLAT-RC33/126986:user/ota-rel-keys,release-keys]
[ro.build.changelist]: [17615# end build properties]
另一方面，来自1.5 SDK的模拟器，运行1.5镜像，也有根，可能类似于Android Dev Phone 1(你可能想要允许)，并有这个:
cmb@apollo:~$ adb -e shell getprop |grep build
[ro.build.id]: [CUPCAKE]
[ro.build.display.id]: [sdk-eng 1.5 CUPCAKE 148875 test-keys]
[ro.build.version.incremental]: [148875]
[ro.build.version.sdk]: [3]
[ro.build.version.release]: [1.5]
[ro.build.date]: [Thu May 14 18:09:10 PDT 2009]
[ro.build.date.utc]: [1242349750]
[ro.build.type]: [eng]
[ro.build.user]: [android-build]
[ro.build.host]: [undroid16.mtv.corp.google.com]
[ro.build.tags]: [test-keys]
[ro.build.product]: [generic]
[ro.build.description]: [sdk-eng 1.5 CUPCAKE 148875 test-keys]
[ro.build.fingerprint]: [generic/sdk/generic/:1.5/CUPCAKE/148875:eng/test-keys]
至于零售构建，我手头没有，但在site:xda developers.com下的各种搜索提供了大量信息。这是荷兰的G1, ro。build。tags没有test-key，我认为这可能是最可靠的属性。
截至2021年(今天)，似乎没有任何可靠的方法或方法来检测根目录，特别是在启用了MagiskHide等强大的隐藏工具的情况下。这里的大多数答案都不再相关，所以不要在生产中使用它。依靠可靠的检查，如SafetyNet，而不是额外的英里检测根，我建议在两个运行时保护你的应用程序，如防止调试器/检测，并确保使用混淆。
我建议使用本机代码进行根检测。 下面是一个完整的工作示例。
JAVA包装程序:
package com.kozhevin.rootchecks.util;
import android.support.annotation.NonNull;
import com.kozhevin.rootchecks.BuildConfig;
public class MeatGrinder {
private final static String LIB_NAME = "native-lib";
private static boolean isLoaded;
private static boolean isUnderTest = false;
private MeatGrinder() {
}
public boolean isLibraryLoaded() {
if (isLoaded) {
return true;
}
try {
if(isUnderTest) {
throw new UnsatisfiedLinkError("under test");
}
System.loadLibrary(LIB_NAME);
isLoaded = true;
} catch (UnsatisfiedLinkError e) {
if (BuildConfig.DEBUG) {
e.printStackTrace();
}
}
return isLoaded;
}
public native boolean isDetectedDevKeys();
public native boolean isDetectedTestKeys();
public native boolean isNotFoundReleaseKeys();
public native boolean isFoundDangerousProps();
public native boolean isPermissiveSelinux();
public native boolean isSuExists();
public native boolean isAccessedSuperuserApk();
public native boolean isFoundSuBinary();
public native boolean isFoundBusyboxBinary();
public native boolean isFoundXposed();
public native boolean isFoundResetprop();
public native boolean isFoundWrongPathPermission();
public native boolean isFoundHooks();
@NonNull
public static MeatGrinder getInstance() {
return InstanceHolder.INSTANCE;
}
private static class InstanceHolder {
private static final MeatGrinder INSTANCE = new MeatGrinder();
}
}
JNI包装器(native-lib.c):
JNIEXPORT jboolean JNICALL
Java_com_kozhevin_rootchecks_util_MeatGrinder_isDetectedTestKeys(
JNIEnv *env,
jobject this ) {
return (jboolean) isDetectedTestKeys();
}
JNIEXPORT jboolean JNICALL
Java_com_kozhevin_rootchecks_util_MeatGrinder_isDetectedDevKeys(
JNIEnv *env,
jobject this ) {
return (jboolean) isDetectedDevKeys();
}
JNIEXPORT jboolean JNICALL
Java_com_kozhevin_rootchecks_util_MeatGrinder_isNotFoundReleaseKeys(
JNIEnv *env,
jobject this ) {
return (jboolean) isNotFoundReleaseKeys();
}
JNIEXPORT jboolean JNICALL
Java_com_kozhevin_rootchecks_util_MeatGrinder_isFoundDangerousProps(
JNIEnv *env,
jobject this ) {
return (jboolean) isFoundDangerousProps();
}
JNIEXPORT jboolean JNICALL
Java_com_kozhevin_rootchecks_util_MeatGrinder_isPermissiveSelinux(
JNIEnv *env,
jobject this ) {
return (jboolean) isPermissiveSelinux();
}
JNIEXPORT jboolean JNICALL
Java_com_kozhevin_rootchecks_util_MeatGrinder_isSuExists(
JNIEnv *env,
jobject this ) {
return (jboolean) isSuExists();
}
JNIEXPORT jboolean JNICALL
Java_com_kozhevin_rootchecks_util_MeatGrinder_isAccessedSuperuserApk(
JNIEnv *env,
jobject this ) {
return (jboolean) isAccessedSuperuserApk();
}
JNIEXPORT jboolean JNICALL
Java_com_kozhevin_rootchecks_util_MeatGrinder_isFoundSuBinary(
JNIEnv *env,
jobject this ) {
return (jboolean) isFoundSuBinary();
}
JNIEXPORT jboolean JNICALL
Java_com_kozhevin_rootchecks_util_MeatGrinder_isFoundBusyboxBinary(
JNIEnv *env,
jobject this ) {
return (jboolean) isFoundBusyboxBinary();
}
JNIEXPORT jboolean JNICALL
Java_com_kozhevin_rootchecks_util_MeatGrinder_isFoundXposed(
JNIEnv *env,
jobject this ) {
return (jboolean) isFoundXposed();
}
JNIEXPORT jboolean JNICALL
Java_com_kozhevin_rootchecks_util_MeatGrinder_isFoundResetprop(
JNIEnv *env,
jobject this ) {
return (jboolean) isFoundResetprop();
}
JNIEXPORT jboolean JNICALL
Java_com_kozhevin_rootchecks_util_MeatGrinder_isFoundWrongPathPermission(
JNIEnv *env,
jobject this ) {
return (jboolean) isFoundWrongPathPermission();
}
JNIEXPORT jboolean JNICALL
Java_com_kozhevin_rootchecks_util_MeatGrinder_isFoundHooks(
JNIEnv *env,
jobject this ) {
return (jboolean) isFoundHooks();
}
常量:
// Comma-separated tags describing the build, like= "unsigned,debug".
const char *const ANDROID_OS_BUILD_TAGS = "ro.build.tags";
// A string that uniquely identifies this build. 'BRAND/PRODUCT/DEVICE:RELEASE/ID/VERSION.INCREMENTAL:TYPE/TAGS'.
const char *const ANDROID_OS_BUILD_FINGERPRINT = "ro.build.fingerprint";
const char *const ANDROID_OS_SECURE = "ro.secure";
const char *const ANDROID_OS_DEBUGGABLE = "ro.debuggable";
const char *const ANDROID_OS_SYS_INITD = "sys.initd";
const char *const ANDROID_OS_BUILD_SELINUX = "ro.build.selinux";
//see https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/core/+/master/adb/services.cpp#86
const char *const SERVICE_ADB_ROOT = "service.adb.root";
const char * const MG_SU_PATH[] = {
"/data/local/",
"/data/local/bin/",
"/data/local/xbin/",
"/sbin/",
"/system/bin/",
"/system/bin/.ext/",
"/system/bin/failsafe/",
"/system/sd/xbin/",
"/su/xbin/",
"/su/bin/",
"/magisk/.core/bin/",
"/system/usr/we-need-root/",
"/system/xbin/",
0
};
const char * const MG_EXPOSED_FILES[] = {
"/system/lib/libxposed_art.so",
"/system/lib64/libxposed_art.so",
"/system/xposed.prop",
"/cache/recovery/xposed.zip",
"/system/framework/XposedBridge.jar",
"/system/bin/app_process64_xposed",
"/system/bin/app_process32_xposed",
"/magisk/xposed/system/lib/libsigchain.so",
"/magisk/xposed/system/lib/libart.so",
"/magisk/xposed/system/lib/libart-disassembler.so",
"/magisk/xposed/system/lib/libart-compiler.so",
"/system/bin/app_process32_orig",
"/system/bin/app_process64_orig",
0
};
const char * const MG_READ_ONLY_PATH[] = {
"/system",
"/system/bin",
"/system/sbin",
"/system/xbin",
"/vendor/bin",
"/sbin",
"/etc",
0
};
本地代码的根检测:
struct mntent *getMntent(FILE *fp, struct mntent *e, char *buf, int buf_len) {
while (fgets(buf, buf_len, fp) != NULL) {
// Entries look like "/dev/block/vda /system ext4 ro,seclabel,relatime,data=ordered 0 0".
// That is: mnt_fsname mnt_dir mnt_type mnt_opts mnt_freq mnt_passno.
int fsname0, fsname1, dir0, dir1, type0, type1, opts0, opts1;
if (sscanf(buf, " %n%*s%n %n%*s%n %n%*s%n %n%*s%n %d %d",
&fsname0, &fsname1, &dir0, &dir1, &type0, &type1, &opts0, &opts1,
&e->mnt_freq, &e->mnt_passno) == 2) {
e->mnt_fsname = &buf[fsname0];
buf[fsname1] = '\0';
e->mnt_dir = &buf[dir0];
buf[dir1] = '\0';
e->mnt_type = &buf[type0];
buf[type1] = '\0';
e->mnt_opts = &buf[opts0];
buf[opts1] = '\0';
return e;
}
}
return NULL;
}
bool isPresentMntOpt(const struct mntent *pMnt, const char *pOpt) {
char *token = pMnt->mnt_opts;
const char *end = pMnt->mnt_opts + strlen(pMnt->mnt_opts);
const size_t optLen = strlen(pOpt);
while (token != NULL) {
const char *tokenEnd = token + optLen;
if (tokenEnd > end) break;
if (memcmp(token, pOpt, optLen) == 0 &&
(*tokenEnd == '\0' || *tokenEnd == ',' || *tokenEnd == '=')) {
return true;
}
token = strchr(token, ',');
if (token != NULL) {
token++;
}
}
return false;
}
static char *concat2str(const char *pString1, const char *pString2) {
char *result;
size_t lengthBuffer = 0;
lengthBuffer = strlen(pString1) +
strlen(pString2) + 1;
result = malloc(lengthBuffer);
if (result == NULL) {
GR_LOGW("malloc failed\n");
return NULL;
}
memset(result, 0, lengthBuffer);
strcpy(result, pString1);
strcat(result, pString2);
return result;
}
static bool
isBadPropertyState(const char *key, const char *badValue, bool isObligatoryProperty, bool isExact) {
if (badValue == NULL) {
GR_LOGE("badValue may not be NULL");
return false;
}
if (key == NULL) {
GR_LOGE("key may not be NULL");
return false;
}
char value[PROP_VALUE_MAX + 1];
int length = __system_property_get(key, value);
bool result = false;
/* A length 0 value indicates that the property is not defined */
if (length > 0) {
GR_LOGI("property:[%s]==[%s]", key, value);
if (isExact) {
if (strcmp(value, badValue) == 0) {
GR_LOGW("bad value[%s] equals to [%s] in the property [%s]", value, badValue, key);
result = true;
}
} else {
if (strlen(value) >= strlen(badValue) && strstr(value, badValue) != NULL) {
GR_LOGW("bad value[%s] found in [%s] in the property [%s]", value, badValue, key);
result = true;
}
}
} else {
GR_LOGI("[%s] property not found", key);
if (isObligatoryProperty) {
result = true;
}
}
return result;
}
bool isDetectedTestKeys() {
const char *TEST_KEYS_VALUE = "test-keys";
return isBadPropertyState(ANDROID_OS_BUILD_TAGS, TEST_KEYS_VALUE, true, false);
}
bool isDetectedDevKeys() {
const char *DEV_KEYS_VALUE = "dev-keys";
return isBadPropertyState(ANDROID_OS_BUILD_TAGS, DEV_KEYS_VALUE, true, false);
}
bool isNotFoundReleaseKeys() {
const char *RELEASE_KEYS_VALUE = "release-keys";
return !isBadPropertyState(ANDROID_OS_BUILD_TAGS, RELEASE_KEYS_VALUE, false, true);
}
bool isFoundWrongPathPermission() {
bool result = false;
FILE *file = fopen("/proc/mounts", "r");
char mntent_strings[BUFSIZ];
if (file == NULL) {
GR_LOGE("setmntent");
return result;
}
struct mntent ent = {0};
while (NULL != getMntent(file, &ent, mntent_strings, sizeof(mntent_strings))) {
for (size_t i = 0; MG_READ_ONLY_PATH[i]; i++) {
if (strcmp((&ent)->mnt_dir, MG_READ_ONLY_PATH[i]) == 0 &&
isPresentMntOpt(&ent, "rw")) {
GR_LOGI("%s %s %s %s\n", (&ent)->mnt_fsname, (&ent)->mnt_dir, (&ent)->mnt_opts,
(&ent)->mnt_type);
result = true;
break;
}
}
memset(&ent, 0, sizeof(ent));
}
fclose(file);
return result;
}
bool isFoundDangerousProps() {
const char *BAD_DEBUGGABLE_VALUE = "1";
const char *BAD_SECURE_VALUE = "0";
const char *BAD_SYS_INITD_VALUE = "1";
const char *BAD_SERVICE_ADB_ROOT_VALUE = "1";
bool result = isBadPropertyState(ANDROID_OS_DEBUGGABLE, BAD_DEBUGGABLE_VALUE, true, true) ||
isBadPropertyState(SERVICE_ADB_ROOT, BAD_SERVICE_ADB_ROOT_VALUE, false, true) ||
isBadPropertyState(ANDROID_OS_SECURE, BAD_SECURE_VALUE, true, true) ||
isBadPropertyState(ANDROID_OS_SYS_INITD, BAD_SYS_INITD_VALUE, false, true);
return result;
}
bool isPermissiveSelinux() {
const char *BAD_VALUE = "0";
return isBadPropertyState(ANDROID_OS_BUILD_SELINUX, BAD_VALUE, false, false);
}
bool isSuExists() {
char buf[BUFSIZ];
char *str = NULL;
char *temp = NULL;
size_t size = 1; // start with size of 1 to make room for null terminator
size_t strlength;
FILE *pipe = popen("which su", "r");
if (pipe == NULL) {
GR_LOGI("pipe is null");
return false;
}
while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), pipe) != NULL) {
strlength = strlen(buf);
temp = realloc(str, size + strlength); // allocate room for the buf that gets appended
if (temp == NULL) {
// allocation error
GR_LOGE("Error (re)allocating memory");
pclose(pipe);
if (str != NULL) {
free(str);
}
return false;
} else {
str = temp;
}
strcpy(str + size - 1, buf);
size += strlength;
}
pclose(pipe);
GR_LOGW("A size of the result from pipe is [%zu], result:\n [%s] ", size, str);
if (str != NULL) {
free(str);
}
return size > 1 ? true : false;
}
static bool isAccessedFile(const char *path) {
int result = access(path, F_OK);
GR_LOGV("[%s] has been accessed with result: [%d]", path, result);
return result == 0 ? true : false;
}
static bool isFoundBinaryFromArray(const char *const *array, const char *binary) {
for (size_t i = 0; array[i]; ++i) {
char *checkedPath = concat2str(array[i], binary);
if (checkedPath == NULL) { // malloc failed
return false;
}
bool result = isAccessedFile(checkedPath);
free(checkedPath);
if (result) {
return result;
}
}
return false;
}
bool isAccessedSuperuserApk() {
return isAccessedFile("/system/app/Superuser.apk");
}
bool isFoundResetprop() {
return isAccessedFile("/data/magisk/resetprop");
}
bool isFoundSuBinary() {
return isFoundBinaryFromArray(MG_SU_PATH, "su");
}
bool isFoundBusyboxBinary() {
return isFoundBinaryFromArray(MG_SU_PATH, "busybox");
}
bool isFoundXposed() {
for (size_t i = 0; MG_EXPOSED_FILES[i]; ++i) {
bool result = isAccessedFile(MG_EXPOSED_FILES[i]);
if (result) {
return result;
}
}
return false;
}
bool isFoundHooks() {
bool result = false;
pid_t pid = getpid();
char maps_file_name[512];
sprintf(maps_file_name, "/proc/%d/maps", pid);
GR_LOGI("try to open [%s]", maps_file_name);
const size_t line_size = BUFSIZ;
char *line = malloc(line_size);
if (line == NULL) {
return result;
}
FILE *fp = fopen(maps_file_name, "r");
if (fp == NULL) {
free(line);
return result;
}
memset(line, 0, line_size);
const char *substrate = "com.saurik.substrate";
const char *xposed = "XposedBridge.jar";
while (fgets(line, line_size, fp) != NULL) {
const size_t real_line_size = strlen(line);
if ((real_line_size >= strlen(substrate) && strstr(line, substrate) != NULL) ||
(real_line_size >= strlen(xposed) && strstr(line, xposed) != NULL)) {
GR_LOGI("found in [%s]: [%s]", maps_file_name, line);
result = true;
break;
}
}
free(line);
fclose(fp);
return result;
}
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