假定原则:

第一个屏幕必须是非常简单的低开销HTML，带有一个易于识别的按钮(游戏邦注:无论是机器人还是玩家)，以明确表示“我想要我的垃圾”。因为我们假设了最坏的情况-你有来自机器人和非机器人组合的DOS攻击，所有人都首先点击网站(就可识别性而言)。所以让我们尽快把这些从缓存，良性回声机器人等中分发出去。

(注:就追求者而言，这就是发生的事情;这对用户和Woot来说都是痛苦的，所以任何有助于吸收或缓解首次屏幕获取的内容都符合三方的利益。)

然后，对于非机器人来说，这个过程不需要比现在更糟糕，对于正版机器人来说，不需要额外的步骤(或痛苦)。(关于当前设计的背景说明:当前的wooters通常已经签约，或者可以在购买过程中签约。新买家需要在购买时进行注册。所以实际上已经注册和已经登录会更快。)

为了完成垃圾销售，需要导航一系列交易屏幕(比如5个正负，取决于具体情况)。获胜者是第一个完成全部导航的人。当前进程奖励那些最快完成整个5个屏幕序列的机器人(或其他人);但整个进程都偏向于快速响应(即机器人)。

毫无疑问，机器人将在第一个屏幕上占据优势;无论他们在这一点上取得了什么优势，他们都会在剩下的屏幕上保持下去，再加上身体在其他阶段提供的任何优势。

What if Woot were to intentionally decouple the queuing process after the first screen, and feed every session from that point into a sequence of fixed-minimum-time steps? The second screen wouldn't even be presented until 30 seconds had passed; after it was submitted, same for the following screens. I bet wooters would have no problem if they were told that, after the first screen, they would wait in a queue (which is already true) that would spread the load over time in a way that should take no longer than before, be more robust, and help weed out the bots. At this point you can throw in some of the bot speedbumps listed above (subtle variations in DOM objects, etc.) Just the benefit from the perception that Woot is a little more in control of things would help.

If a much higher proportion of the BOC initial hits could segue into a bot-unfriendlier non-time-critical process on their first hit (or close to it), rather than retrying, then real people who get past that point would have more confidence. For sure it would be less hostile than the current situation. It might cut down on the background-noise-ambient-bot-rate that's going on all the time even under normal Woot-Off circumstances. And the bots would lay off the main page and sit in the queue with each other (and everyone else) where they have no advantage.

Hmmm... The concept "apartment-threaded" comes to mind. I wonder if the pattern is approximately useful? A useful core concept here is being able, after the first screen, to track accumulated total time in queue and be able to adjust to standard. As a bot-mitigation strategy, you would have a little bit of flexibility to maybe fudge the very earliest sessions by maybe 5-10 seconds; doing so would probably be undetectable, but would result in a richer non-bot purchase mix. I'm sure you have statistics to help evaluate stuff like this after the fact. Just for fun, you could (at least for one wootoff) put together your own bot that combines the best features you've seen, and then hand it out to everyone the day before. Then at least everyone would be equally armed. (Then duck ... incoming ...)

我同意OP在这里-请不要验证码-这不是一个非常woot的做事方式。

首先设置一些机器人陷阱。我会在主页上更经常地提到BOC，让机器人看起来不智能，所以每次措辞都不同。“中行投诉上升!”所以扫描关键词的机器人会被困住。

然而，我认为真正的问题是双重的，首先是你需要解决的性能问题，今天是机器人造成了一个问题，但它向我表明，有一个性能问题需要解决。

其次，这是一个商业机会，可以把一些真正的垃圾转化为利润。所以我将保持整体woot风格并声明“我们检查机器人”。如果我们认为你是机器人，你就会得到一盒垃圾。”

机器人检查将在销售完成后的某个时间离线完成，使用机器人陷阱，IP号码，cookie，会话，浏览器字符串等。对你获得的购买者数据做一些认真的分析，以决定谁得到了废话。如果你决定发布垃圾，那么你就可以把一些正常的垃圾卖给别人。

首先，让我回顾一下我们需要做的事情。我意识到我只是在转述最初的问题，但重要的是我们要百分之百地理解这个问题，因为有很多很好的建议，4个中有2个或3个是正确的，但正如我将演示的那样，您将需要一个多方面的方法来满足所有的需求。

要求1:摆脱“机器人抨击”:

首页的快速“猛击”正在损害网站的性能，这是问题的核心。这种“猛击”既来自单ip机器人，也可能来自僵尸网络。我们想把两者都去掉。

要求二:不要破坏用户体验:

我们可以通过实施一个讨厌的验证程序来有效地解决机器人的情况，比如打电话给操作员，解决一堆验证码，或类似的问题，但这就像强迫每个无辜的飞机乘客跳过疯狂的安全圈，只是为了抓住最愚蠢的恐怖分子的渺茫机会。哦，等等，我们真的这么做了。但让我们看看在woot.com上能否做到这一点。

要求三:避免“军备竞赛”

正如您所提到的，您不希望卷入垃圾邮件机器人军备竞赛。因此，您不能使用隐藏或混乱的表单字段、数学问题等简单的调整，因为它们本质上是可以简单地自动检测和规避的模糊度量。

需求4:挫败“警报”机器人:

这可能是您的要求中最困难的。即使我们可以进行有效的人类验证挑战，机器人仍然可以在你的首页上投票，并在有新报价时提醒编剧。我们也想让那些机器人变得不可行。这是第一个需求的更强版本，因为机器人不仅不能发出破坏性能的快速请求——它们甚至不能发出足够多的重复请求来及时向脚本人员发送“警报”以赢得报价。

好，让我们看看是否能满足这四个条件。首先，正如我提到的，没有一种测量方法能达到目的。你将不得不结合一些技巧来实现它，你将不得不忍受两个烦恼:

少数用户将被要求经历重重考验 少数用户将无法获得特别优惠

我知道这些都很烦人，但如果我们能让“小”的数字足够小，我希望你会同意利大于弊。

第一个措施:基于用户的节流:

这个很简单，我相信你已经做过了。如果用户已登录，并保持每秒刷新600次(或其他)，您将停止响应并告诉他冷却。事实上，你可能会更早地限制他的请求，但你明白我的意思。这样，一个登录的机器人将被禁止/节流一旦它开始投票你的网站。这是简单的部分。那些未经验证的机器人才是我们真正的问题，下面就来谈谈它们:

第二个措施:某种形式的知识产权限制，正如几乎所有人都建议的那样:

No matter what, you will have to do some IP based throttling to thwart the 'bot slamming'. Since it seems important to you to allow unauthenticated (non-logged-in) visitors to get the special offers, you only have IPs to go by initially, and although they're not perfect, they do work against single-IP bots. Botnets are a different beast, but I'll come back to those. For now, we will do some simple throttling to beat rapid-fire single-IP bots. The performance hit is negligable if you run the IP check before all other processing, use a proxy server for the throttling logic, and store the IPs in a memcached lookup-optimized tree structure.

第三种方法:用缓存的响应掩盖油门:

With rapid-fire single-IP bots throttled, we still have to address slow single-IP bots, ie. bots that are specifically tweaked to 'fly under the radar' by spacing requests slightly further apart than the throttling prevents. To instantly render slow single-IP bots useless, simply use the strategy suggested by abelenky: serve 10-minute-old cached pages to all IPs that have been spotted in the last 24 hours (or so). That way, every IP gets one 'chance' per day/hour/week (depending on the period you choose), and there will be no visible annoyance to real users who are just hitting 'reload', except that they don't win the offer. The beauty of this measure is that is also thwarts 'alarm bots', as long as they don't originate from a botnet. (I know you would probably prefer it if real users were allowed to refresh over and over, but there is no way to tell a refresh-spamming human from a request-spamming bot apart without a CAPTCHA or similar)

第四项措施:

You are right that CAPTCHAs hurt the user experience and should be avoided. However, in _one_ situation they can be your best friend: If you've designed a very restrictive system to thwart bots, that - because of its restrictiveness - also catches a number of false positives; then a CAPTCHA served as a last resort will allow those real users who get caught to slip by your throttling (thus avoiding annoying DoS situations). The sweet spot, of course, is when ALL the bots get caught in your net, while extremely few real users get bothered by the CAPTCHA. If you, when serving up the 10-minute-old cached pages, also offer an alternative, optional, CAPTCHA-verified 'front page refresher', then humans who really want to keep refreshing, can still do so without getting the old cached page, but at the cost of having to solve a CAPTCHA for each refresh. That is an annoyance, but an optional one just for the die-hard users, who tend to be more forgiving because they know they're gaming the system to improve their chances, and that improved chances don't come free.

第五种方法:诱饵废话:

Christopher Mahan had an idea that I rather liked, but I would put a different spin on it. Every time you are preparing a new offer, prepare two other 'offers' as well, that no human would pick, like a 12mm wingnut for $20. When the offer appears on the front page, put all three 'offers' in the same picture, with numbers corresponding to each offer. When the user/bot actually goes on to order the item, they will have to pick (a radio button) which offer they want, and since most bots would merely be guessing, in two out of three cases, the bots would be buying worthless junk. Naturally, this doesn't address 'alarm bots', and there is a (slim) chance that someone could build a bot that was able to pick the correct item. However, the risk of accidentally buying junk should make scripters turn entirely from the fully automated bots.

第六项措施:僵尸网络节流:

(删除)

Okay............ I've now spent most of my evening thinking about this, trying different approaches.... global delays.... cookie-based tokens.. queued serving... 'stranger throttling'.... And it just doesn't work. It doesn't. I realized the main reason why you hadn't accepted any answer yet was that noone had proposed a way to thwart a distributed/zombie net/botnet attack.... so I really wanted to crack it. I believe I cracked the botnet problem for authentication in a different thread, so I had high hopes for your problem as well. But my approach doesn't translate to this. You only have IPs to go by, and a large enough botnet doesn't reveal itself in any analysis based on IP addresses.

所以你知道了，第六小节是零。没什么。邮政编码。除非僵尸网络很小，或者足够快，可以被通常的IP限制，否则我不认为有任何有效的措施可以对抗僵尸网络，而不涉及明确的人类验证，如CAPTHAs。我很抱歉，但我认为结合以上五种方法是你最好的选择。你可能只需要abelenky的10分钟缓存技巧就可以了。

让机器人在公平的场地上竞争。加密时间戳并将其粘贴在隐藏表单字段中。当您收到提交文件时，解密它并查看已经过了多长时间。如果它超过了人类打字能力的阈值，则拒绝它。现在机器人和人类只能以同样的速度购买这袋垃圾。

你们为什么不封杀那些被你们认定为机器人的用户的信用卡呢?

在你的网站上发布使用机器人是非法的 找到识别机器人的某些启发式方法(例如，可以通过短期IP跟踪或通过它们检查表单所需的时间来完成) 如果你标记为机器人的人购买了该商品，冻结他的信用卡以备将来使用 下次他想买东西的时候，不让他买，把商品退回库存

我想即使是专业人士最终也会用完信用卡的。

一旦装瓶者放弃你，你的服务器负载就会随着时间而减少。另一个想法是在不同的服务器之间分离页面——例如，RSS提要在一个服务器上，主页在另一个服务器上，结帐在另一个服务器上。

祝你好运。

将道具卖给非脚本人。 不要让“正常”用户完成任何任务来证明他们是人类。

所以基本上你想知道一个特定的用户是否是一个人，而不需要他们证明。据我所知，这在网上是不可能的，抱歉。

我建议将机制改为拍卖。