如果没有用户的合作，识别访问网站的电脑是不可能的。但是，如果他们允许，您可以存储一个cookie，以便在机器再次访问您的网站时识别它。关键在于，访问者是可控的;他们可以删除cookie，并随时以新访客的身份出现。

cookie和非cookie方法都有缺陷。但是如果你能原谅cookie方法的缺点，这里有一个想法。

如果你已经在你的网站上使用谷歌Analytics，那么你不需要自己编写代码来跟踪独特的用户。谷歌分析为您通过__utma cookie值，如谷歌的文档中所述。通过重用这个值，您不会创建额外的cookie有效负载，这对于页面请求具有效率优势。

您可以很容易地编写一些代码来访问该值，或者使用脚本的getUniqueId()函数。

一个技巧:

Create 2 Registration Pages: First Registration Page: without any email or security check (just with username and password) Second Registration Page: with high security level (email verification request and security image and etc.) For customer satisfaction, and easy registration, default registration page should be the (First Registration Page) but in the (First Registration Page) there is a hidden restriction. It's IP Restriction. If an IP tried to register for second time, (for example less than 1 hour) instead of showing the block page. you can show the (Second Registration Page) automatically. in the (First Registration Page) you can set (for example: block 2 attempts from 1 ip for just 1 hour or 24 hours) and after (for example) 1 hour, you can open access from that ip automatically

请注意:(第一注册页)和(第二注册页)不应在分开的页面。你只写了一页。(例如:register.php)，并在第一PHP样式和第二PHP样式之间切换

这些人开发了一种指纹识别方法，可以非常准确地识别用户:

https://panopticlick.eff.org/static/browser-uniqueness.pdf

We investigate the degree to which modern web browsers are subject to “device fingerprinting” via the version and configuration information that they will transmit to websites upon request. We implemented one possible fingerprinting algorithm, and collected these fingerprints from a large sample of browsers that visited our test side, panopticlick.eff.org. We observe that the distribution of our finger- print contains at least 18.1 bits of entropy, meaning that if we pick a browser at random, at best we expect that only one in 286,777 other browsers will share its fingerprint. Among browsers that support Flash or Java, the situation is worse, with the average browser carrying at least 18.8 bits of identifying information. 94.2% of browsers with Flash or Java were unique in our sample.

通过观察回访用户，我们估计浏览器指纹随时间变化的速度。在我们的样本中，指纹变化很大 很快，但即使是一个简单的启发式通常也能猜出指纹是先前观察到的浏览器的“升级”版本 指纹，99.1%的猜测正确率和假阳性率只有 0.86%。

We discuss what privacy threat browser fingerprinting poses in practice, and what countermeasures may be appropriate to prevent it. There is a tradeoff between protection against fingerprintability and certain kinds of debuggability, which in current browsers is weighted heavily against privacy. Paradoxically, anti-fingerprinting privacy technologies can be self- defeating if they are not used by a sufficient number of people; we show that some privacy measures currently fall victim to this paradox, but others do not.

我的文章可能不是一个解决方案，但我可以提供一个例子，这个功能已经实现。

如果你第一次在电脑上访问www.supertorrents.org的注册页面，没问题。但如果您刷新页面或再次打开页面，它会识别出您之前访问过该页面。真正的美妙之处在于——即使你重新安装Windows或其他操作系统，它也能识别出来。

我在某处读到，他们存储CPU ID。虽然我不知道他们是怎么做到的，但我非常怀疑，他们可能使用MAC地址来做到这一点。

如果我知道怎么做，我一定会分享的。

The suggestions to use cookies aside, the only comprehensive set of identifying attributes available to interrogate are contained in the HTTP request header. So it is possible to use some subset of these to create a pseudo-unique identifier for a user agent (i.e., browser). Further, most of this information is possibly already being logged in the so-called "access log" of your web server software by default and, if not, can be easily configured to do so. Then, a utlity could be developed that simply scans the content of this log, creating fingerprints of each request comprised of, say, the IP address and User Agent string, etc. The more data available, even including the contents of specific cookies, adds to the quality of the uniqueness of this fingerprint. Though, as many others have stated already, the HTTP protocol doesn't make this 100% foolproof - at best it can only be a fairly good indicator.