一个技巧:

Create 2 Registration Pages: First Registration Page: without any email or security check (just with username and password) Second Registration Page: with high security level (email verification request and security image and etc.) For customer satisfaction, and easy registration, default registration page should be the (First Registration Page) but in the (First Registration Page) there is a hidden restriction. It's IP Restriction. If an IP tried to register for second time, (for example less than 1 hour) instead of showing the block page. you can show the (Second Registration Page) automatically. in the (First Registration Page) you can set (for example: block 2 attempts from 1 ip for just 1 hour or 24 hours) and after (for example) 1 hour, you can open access from that ip automatically

请注意:(第一注册页)和(第二注册页)不应在分开的页面。你只写了一页。(例如:register.php)，并在第一PHP样式和第二PHP样式之间切换

这些人开发了一种指纹识别方法，可以非常准确地识别用户:

https://panopticlick.eff.org/static/browser-uniqueness.pdf

We investigate the degree to which modern web browsers are subject to “device fingerprinting” via the version and configuration information that they will transmit to websites upon request. We implemented one possible fingerprinting algorithm, and collected these fingerprints from a large sample of browsers that visited our test side, panopticlick.eff.org. We observe that the distribution of our finger- print contains at least 18.1 bits of entropy, meaning that if we pick a browser at random, at best we expect that only one in 286,777 other browsers will share its fingerprint. Among browsers that support Flash or Java, the situation is worse, with the average browser carrying at least 18.8 bits of identifying information. 94.2% of browsers with Flash or Java were unique in our sample.

通过观察回访用户，我们估计浏览器指纹随时间变化的速度。在我们的样本中，指纹变化很大 很快，但即使是一个简单的启发式通常也能猜出指纹是先前观察到的浏览器的“升级”版本 指纹，99.1%的猜测正确率和假阳性率只有 0.86%。

We discuss what privacy threat browser fingerprinting poses in practice, and what countermeasures may be appropriate to prevent it. There is a tradeoff between protection against fingerprintability and certain kinds of debuggability, which in current browsers is weighted heavily against privacy. Paradoxically, anti-fingerprinting privacy technologies can be self- defeating if they are not used by a sufficient number of people; we show that some privacy measures currently fall victim to this paradox, but others do not.

The suggestions to use cookies aside, the only comprehensive set of identifying attributes available to interrogate are contained in the HTTP request header. So it is possible to use some subset of these to create a pseudo-unique identifier for a user agent (i.e., browser). Further, most of this information is possibly already being logged in the so-called "access log" of your web server software by default and, if not, can be easily configured to do so. Then, a utlity could be developed that simply scans the content of this log, creating fingerprints of each request comprised of, say, the IP address and User Agent string, etc. The more data available, even including the contents of specific cookies, adds to the quality of the uniqueness of this fingerprint. Though, as many others have stated already, the HTTP protocol doesn't make this 100% foolproof - at best it can only be a fairly good indicator.

有一种流行的方法叫做“画布指纹”，在这篇科学文章《网络永不遗忘》中有描述: 野外的持久跟踪机制。一旦你开始寻找它，你会惊讶于它被使用的频率。该方法创建一个唯一的指纹，该指纹对于每个浏览器/硬件组合都是一致的。

本文还介绍了其他持久跟踪方法，如evercookie、respawning http和Flash cookie以及cookie同步。

更多关于画布指纹的信息:

完美像素:HTML5中的指纹画布 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Canvas_fingerprinting

因为我想解决方案工作在所有机器和所有浏览器(在合理的范围内)，我试图使用javascript创建一个解决方案。

这难道不是一个不使用javascript的好理由吗?

正如其他人所说，饼干可能是你最好的选择，但要知道它的局限性。

如果没有用户的合作，识别访问网站的电脑是不可能的。但是，如果他们允许，您可以存储一个cookie，以便在机器再次访问您的网站时识别它。关键在于，访问者是可控的;他们可以删除cookie，并随时以新访客的身份出现。